ABSTRACT The certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme provides the sender with the ability to send the same message to multiple authorized receivers contemporaneously, and at the same time, it can avoid the key escrow problem in the existing identity-based multi-receiver signcryption schemes, which makes it to get great attention in the field of one-to-many communication. However, in the existing certificateless multi-receiver signcryption schemes, a secure channel is essential for their key extract algorithm, which brings some troubles in practical applications. On one hand, the security of the partial private key depends on the secure channel. Once the secure channel is broken by an attacker, the user's partial private key may be leaked. On the other hand, maintaining the secure channel increases the economic cost and implementation complexity of the application systems. Motivated by these concerns, we propose a new anonymous certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme, in which the key generation center only utilizes a public channel to send the pseudo partial private key to the user during the key extract algorithm, and the designated user can work out the real partial private key from the pseudo partial private key while others cannot. The avoidance of the secure channel improves the security of the proposed scheme and makes the communication system much lighter.
of multi-receiver encryption, multi-receiver signcryption [3] ensures the message confidentiality and provides message source verifiability at one time. With the increasing demand for distributed communication, more and more one-to-many application systems have emerged, such as pay-TV program, remote education and network conference [4] . In this case, the research on multi-receiver encryption/signcryption schemes [5] , [6] has become a hotspot in the field of information security.
Beak et al. [7] proposed the first identity-based multireceiver encryption (IBME) scheme, which needs only one pairing computation to encrypt the message for multiple receivers and has higher computational efficiency compared with the traditional one-to-many communication [8] . On its heels, several excellent IBME schemes [9] [10] [11] VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ were proposed. Combining the idea of signcryption [12] , Duan and Cao [3] proposed the first identity-based multireceiver signcryption (IBMS) scheme and gave the unforgeability security model in their paper. Then, some IBMS schemes [13] [14] [15] [16] were put forward one by one. In recent years, privacy leakage incidents occur frequently [17] , and people's awareness of privacy protection has gradually increased. People do not want it to be known by others which websites they visited or which TV programs they watched [18] . With the emphasis on privacy protection, receiver anonymity was introduced into the IBME/IBMS scheme. Many researchers tried to achieve receiver anonymity in multi-receiver encryption/signcryption schemes by using different methods.
Fan et al. [19] put forward the first anonymous IBME scheme, attempting to hide the information of authorized receivers in a Lagrange interpolating polynomial to avoid the disclosure of receivers. Unfortunately, Wang et al. [20] demonstrated that this approach cannot truly achieve receiver anonymity because any authorized receiver can judge whether another person is an authorized receiver. Meanwhile, Wang et al. [20] proposed an improved IBME scheme to ameliorate receiver anonymity. Regrettably, Li and Pang [21] proved that in Wang et al.'s scheme, authorized receivers were still able to determine the identities of other authorized receivers. Later, Tseng et al. [22] proposed an anonymous IBME scheme, which uses a modular polynomial to mix and hide the information of authorized receivers, and they re-defined the adversarial model of receiver anonymity under multi-receiver setting because the previous receiver anonymity security model is suitable for single receiver setting. Inspired by this method, Fan and Tseng [23] proposed another anonymous IBME scheme with chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) security. Their scheme provides authentication function for the receivers, but it uses too many bilinear parings operations, resulting in its low efficiency. In 2016, to perfect privacy protection mechanism, Pang et al. [24] proposed a completely anonymous IBMS scheme, which offers both receiver anonymity and sender anonymity.
However, all the schemes mentioned above have the key escrow problem, because they are designed based on the identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) [25] . That is to say, in these schemes, the key generation center (KGC) holds the private keys of all users, so it could peek at all users' communication information and could disguise himself as any user to sign a message. To solve the key escrow problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson [26] proposed the certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), which attracts the attention of many scholars and institutions rapidly, and based on Al-Riyami et al. ' s thought, many certificateless encryption/signcryption schemes [27] [28] [29] [30] were proposed successively. Selvi et al. [31] proposed the first certificateless multi-receiver signcryption (CLMS) scheme, and defined the message confidentiality security model and unforgeability security model of the CLMS scheme. However, Selvi et al. ' s scheme does not satisfy the message confidentiality under external attacks, so they proposed an improved CLMS scheme [32] . Unfortunately, Miao et al. [33] proved that the improved CLMS scheme [32] cannot meet the message confidentiality under external attacks either. In addition, both of Selvi et al.'s schemes [31] , [32] do not consider receiver anonymity, and they are inefficient during signcryption process because too many bilinear pairings are used.
To reduce the computational complexity, Islam et al. [34] proposed a new anonymous certificateless multi-receiver encryption (CLME) scheme, which uses scalar point multiplications on elliptic curve cryptography instead of bilinear pairings and probabilistic map-to-point functions. Besides, Islam et al.' s scheme achieves receiver anonymity by using modular polynomial put forward by Tseng et al., and defines the receiver anonymity security model of the CLME scheme. However, Hung et al. [35] pointed out that Islam et al.'s scheme is not suitable for mobile devices since its computation cost of the encryption operation is quadric with the receivers' number, and at the same time, Hung et al. [35] proposed another anonymous CLME scheme whose computation cost of the encryption operation is linear with the receivers' number. Regrettably, Hung et al.'s scheme uses too many bilinear pairings operations, so it is still low in efficiency. Based on Hung et al. scheme, He et al. [36] proposed an anonymous CLME scheme, which does not need bilinear pairing operations and thus improves the efficiency in some degree. The three schemes [34] [35] [36] mentioned above achieve receiver anonymity, but they do not provide source verifiability.
Later, Tseng and Fan [37] proposed a lightweight CLME scheme, which has high computational efficiency and is suitable for device to device communication on the Internet of Things application. Their scheme provides the function of mutual authentication between the receiver and the sender, but it directly puts the list of authorized receivers in ciphertext, exposing the privacy of authorized receivers. In 2018, Win et al. [38] proposed an anonymous CLME scheme with CCA secure both in message confidentiality and receiver anonymity, and the scheme provides receivers with the function of verifying the sender. However, a large number of bilinear pairings used in Tseng et al.'s scheme results in its low computational efficiency. At the same year, Pang et al. [39] proposed an anonymous CLMS scheme, which is more efficient than schemes [37] , [38] and offers receiver anonymity and source verifiability. Besides the aforementioned schemes, there are some other outstanding CLME/CLMS schemes [40] [41] [42] [43] with various properties proposed for different application scenarios in recent years.
In all of the CLME/CLMS schemes mentioned above, the user's private key consists of two parts. One is the secret value chosen by the user himself, which is not known by anyone except the user himself, and the other part is the private key generated by KGC, which is usually sent to the user through a secure channel. It should be noted that the usage of the secure channel makes the privacy of the partial 84092 VOLUME 7, 2019 private key depend on the secure channel. Once the secure channel is controlled by an attacker, the user's partial private key is likely to be leaked, which is a terrible security problem for both cryptography and communication systems. In addition, maintaining the secure channel increases the complexity of the communication system and requires additional cost. Improving the security while minimizing the system as much as possible is the pursuit of every system designer [44] . Therefore, it is necessary to propose a certificateless multireceiver signcryption scheme which does not need any secure channel.
Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a new anonymous certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme in this paper. When executing the key extract algorithm in the proposed scheme, KGC and the user transmit all information, including the pseudo partial private key generated by KGC for the user, to each other through public channels. It is easy for the user to extract the real partial private key from the pseudo partial private key, but impossible for the attacker. The elimination of the secure channel brings two benefits, that is, the security of the partial private key is improved and the complexity of the communication system is reduced. In addition, it is proved that the proposed scheme meets message confidentiality, unforgeability and receiver anonymity under the random oracle model. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The related hard problems, algorithm model and security models of the proposed scheme are given in Section II. In Section III, the elaboration of the proposed scheme is given. Section IV makes an analysis of the correctness and the security about the proposed scheme. Then, the comparisons between the proposed scheme and the existing CLME/CLMS schemes in terms of efficiency and functions are given in Section V. Finally, the conclusion about this paper is made in Section VI.
In order to facilitate reading and understanding, notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1 :
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we shall introduce the hard problems, algorithm model and security models related to the proposed scheme.
A. HARD PROBLEMS
We define that G p is an additive cyclic group based on a large prime number p, the point P is a generator of G p and Z Signcryption: With the plaintext message M , the sender's private key SK S , the sender's identity information ID S , the authorized receivers' public key PK i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and Params as input, the sender S runs this algorithm to generate the ciphertext c.
De-Signcryption: With the ciphertext c, the authorized receiver's private key SK i , the sender's public key PK S and Params as input, each receiver runs this algorithm to get the plaintext message M .
C. SECURITY MODELS
The security models of the proposed scheme include message confidentiality, unforgeability and receiver anonymity. There are two types of adversaries called Type I adversary (A I ) and Type II adversary (A II ) [26] respectively in every security model. A I means a malicious adversary who has ability to replace the user's public key, but does not know the system master key s, while A II means an honest-but-curious KGC who knows the system master key s, but is not allowed to replace the user's public key. The specific security models under different adversaries are shown as follows:
1) MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY
The message confidentiality of the proposed scheme is called the indistinguishability of certificateless signcryption against selective multi-receiver chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CLMS-CCA) [34] . We define the following two games called Game 1 and Game 2 to describe IND-CLMS-CCA against the adversary A I and A II , respectively.
Game1 (IND-CLMS-CCA-I): This game is the interaction between the adversary A I and the challenger C under IND-CLMS-CCA.
is defined as a certificateless anonymous multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The specific steps are shown as follows:
Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate the system master key s and the system's public parameters Params, and then keeps s secret and sends Params to A I . After receiving Params, A I selects a set of target multiple identities L * = {ID * 1 , ID * 2 , . . . , ID * n }, where n is a positive integer, and then sends L * to C.
Hash query: A I asks C for a series of queries on hash functions used in the scheme , and C responds the corresponding hash values to A I . is defined as a certificateless anonymous multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The specific steps are shown as follows:
Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate the system master key s and the system's public parameters Params, and then sends s and Params to A II . After receiving s and Params, A II chooses a set of target multiple identities L * = {ID * 1 , ID * 2 , . . . , ID * n }, where n is a positive integer, and then sends L * to C.
Hash query: This step is the same as Hash query in Game 1. 
If for any A II under IND-CLMS-CCA, the probability advantage of winning Game 2 within time τ meets Adv IND-CLMS-CCA-II (A II ) ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ , ε)-IND-CLMS-CCA-II secure, where τ is the polynomial time and ε is a negligible probability advantage.
2) UNFORGEABILITY
The unforgeability model of the proposed scheme is called the strong existential unforgeability of certificateless signcryption against selective multi-receiver chosen plaintext attack (sEUF-CLMS-CPA) [31] . We define the following two games called Game3 and Game4 to describe sEUF-CLMS-CPA against the adversary A I and A II , respectively.
Game 3 (sEUF-CLMS-CPA-I): This game is the interaction between adversary A I and challenger C under sEUF-CLMS-CPA.
Setup: This step is the same as Setup in Game 1.
Hash query: This step is the same as Hash query in Game 1.
Attack: A I asks C for the same queries as Phase 1 in Game 1, and C responds accordingly.
Forgery: With a plaintext M , a sender ID S ∈ L * and a group of receivers identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }, A I forges a ciphertext c * . If the ciphertext c * can be decrypted correctly by all receivers in L, A I wins Game 3. Otherwise, A I fails. There is a restriction that ciphertext c * cannot be generated by the Signcryption query.
Definition 6: If for any A I under sEUF-CLMS-CPA, the probability advantage of winning Game 3 within time τ meets Adv sEUF-CLMS-CPA-I (A I ) ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ , ε)-sEUF-CLMS-CPA-I secure, where τ is the polynomial time and ε is a negligible probability advantage.
Game 4 (sEUF-CLMS-CPA-II): This game is the interaction between adversary A II and the challenger C under sEUF-CLMS-CPA. is defined as a certificateless anonymous multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The specific steps are shown as follows:
Setup: This step is the same as Setup in Game 2.
Attack: A II asks C for the same queries as Phase 1 in Game 2, and C responds accordingly. Definition 7: If for any A II under sEUF-CLMS-CPA, the probability advantage of winning Game 4 within time τ meets Adv sEUF-CLMS-CPA-II A II ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ , ε)-sEUF-CLMS-CPA-II secure, where τ is the polynomial time and ε is a negligible probability advantage.
3) RECEIVER ANONYMITY
The receiver anonymity is called the anonymous indistinguishability of certificateless signcryption against selective multi-receiver chosen ciphertext attack (ANON-IND-CLMS-CCA) [34] . We define the following two games called Game5 and Game6 to achieve ANON-IND-CLMS-CCA against the adversary A I and A II , respectively.
Game5 (ANON-IND-CLMS-CCA-I): This game is the interaction between adversary
Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate the system master key s and the system's public parameters Params, and then keeps s secret and sends Params to is defined as a certificateless anonymous multi-receiver signcryption algorithm. The specific steps are shown as follows: 
= e] − 1|.
Definition 9:
If for any A II under ANON-IND-CLMS-CCA, the probability advantage of winning Game 6 within time τ meets Adv ANON-IND-CLMS-CCA-II (A II ) ≤ ε, the scheme is said to be (τ , ε)-ANON-IND-CLMS-CCA-II secure, where τ is the polynomial time and ε is a negligible probability advantage.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme is composed of four algorithms, named Setup algorithm, Key Extract algorithm, Signcryption algorithm and De-Signcryption algorithm, shown as follows:
This algorithm is run by KGC to generate the system master key and the system's public parameters, and it is composed of the following five steps: 1) With the security parameter λ as input, KGC chooses a large prime number p, determines the finite field F p with its order large prime number p, selects the secure elliptic curve E p on the finite field F p , determines the addition cycle group G p on the elliptic curve E p , and selects a generator P on the addition cycle group G p ;
2) Randomly choose a positive integer s ∈ Z * p as the system master key and keep it secret, and then compute the system public key P pub = sP;
3) Select four secure one-way hash functions, as follows:
4) Select a secure symmetric encryption algorithm E k and the corresponding decryption algorithm D k from the existing symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES, where k is the symmetric key; 5) Construct and publish the system parameters Params
, and keep the system master key s secret.
B. KEY EXTRACT ALGORITHM
This algorithm is run by KGC and the user together to extract the user's private key and public key. It is composed of the following four steps:
The user ID i randomly chooses an integer x i ∈ Z * p as his/her secret value and keeps x i secret, and then computes X i = x i P. After that, he/she sends X i and ID i to KGC through a public channel.
2) Extract-Partial-Private-Key Upon receiving X i and ID i from the user, KGC randomly chooses an integer d i ∈ Z * p , and then computes
where u i is the pseudo partial private key of the user. After that, KGC sends u i and D i to the user through a public channel.
3) Set-Private-Key Upon receiving u i and D i from KGC, the user verifies whether the equation
If yes, the user extracts his/her partial private key y i = u i -H 0 (ID i , x i P pub ) and computes his/her private key SK i = x i +y i ; otherwise, the user rejects the u i and D i , exits the Key Extract algorithm and notifies KGC there is an error.
4) Set-Public-Key (a) The user computes PK i = X i + D i as his/her public key and sends PK i to KGC through a public channel.
(b) Upon receiving PK i from the user, KGC publishes the user's public key PK i .
C. SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
This algorithm is run by a sender S. Before signcryption, the sender S selects a group of users L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } as authorized receivers who have extracted their own keys. It is composed of the following six steps: 1) Randomly choose an integer r ∈ Z * p , and then compute R = rP;
2) Compute K i = r (PK i + H 0 (ID i , PK i )P pub ) and
3) Randomly choose an integer θ ∈ Z * p , and then compute the polynomial: θ , a n −1, . . . , a 1 , a 0 ) and v = SK S + rh(modp); 6) Generate the ciphertext c =< R, Z , h, v, a n −1, . . . , a 1 , a 0 >, and then broadcast the ciphertext c to the receivers.
D. DE-SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
This algorithm is run by every receiver R i , but only authorized receivers can successfully execute De-Signcryption algorithm. It is composed of the following five steps:
2) Restore polynomial f (x) = x n +a n −1x n −1+. . . +a 1 x+ a 0 by using polynomial coefficients < a n −1, . . . , a 1 , a 0 >, and then compute θ = f (α i ) (modp);
5) With the public key PK S of ID S , verify whether the equation vP = PK S + H 0 (ID S , PK S )P pub + hR holds. If yes, the receiver R i accepts M ; otherwise, rejects it.
IV. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY PROOFS
In this section, we will prove the correctness of the proposed scheme and give the formal proof of the security.
A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
The correctness of the proposed scheme depends on the following two theorems.
Theorem 1: The verification of the user's pseudo partial private key in the Key Extract algorithm is correct.
Proof: The correctness of the user's pseudo partial private key verification is guaranteed by the establishment of the equation
The deduction that the equation holds is shown as follows:
Through the above derivation, it can be seen that the equation
Theorem 2: The De-Signcryption algorithm is correct. Proof : The correctness of De-Signcryption algorithm is guaranteed by the establishment of these two equations h = h and vP = PK S + H 0 (ID S , PK S )P pub + hR. The deductions that these two equations hold are shown in following 1) and 2), respectively. 1) For every receiver R i , with the ciphertext c * , he/she can get K i = SK i R and α i = H 1 (ID i , R, K i ), and then he/she can compute θ = f (α i ) (modp) and k = H 2 (θ , R). With the symmetric key k, the receiver can obtain M || ID S = D k (Z ). Finally, he/she can compute h = H 3 (M || ID S , R, θ, a n −1, . . . , a 1 , a 0 ). So the equation h = h holds.
2) After decrypting out the sender's identity ID S , the receiver can acquire the public key PK S . With PK S , the receiver can verify the validity of the signature, shown as follows:
That is to say, the equation vP=PK S +H 0 (ID S , PK S )P pub +hR holds.
Through the derivations of 1) and 2) above, it can be seen that these two equations h = h and vP = PK S + H 0 (ID S , PK S )P pub +hR hold. As a result, the De-Signcryption algorithm is correct.
B. SECURITY PROOFS
Based on security models described in Section 2, we give specific security proofs of the proposed scheme. The message confidentiality is dependent on the establishment of the Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, the unforgeability relies on the establishment of the Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, and the receiver anonymity depends on the establishment of the Theorem 7 and Theorem 8. 
with a non-negligible probability advantage
where T m is the time spent for executing an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation and T i is the time spent for executing a modular inversion operation. Proof : Assume that within the polynomial time τ , the adversary A I can attack the IND-CLMS-CCA-I of the proposed CLMS scheme with a non-negligible probability advantage ε, then there must be a challenger C who can solve the CDHP by interacting with A I ; that is, for given < P, aP, bP >, C will output abP.
C maintains the following initial-empty lists in order to achieve the consistency between queries made by A I :
H 0 list L 0 : This list includes the tuple < ID j , PK j , l j >;
List L C : This list includes the tuple < ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j >.
Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate the system master key s = a ∈ Z * p and the system's public parametersParams Hash queries: A I asks C for a series of the following Hash queries and C responds accordingly as follows:
H 0 -query: With the tuple <ID j , PK j > as input, A I asks C for H 0 query. Upon receiving the query, C searches the list L 0 and responses l j if the tuple <ID j , PK j , l j > is in the list L 0 . Otherwise, C chooses l j ∈ Z * p and responds l j to A I , and then inserts the tuple <ID j , PK j , l j > into L 0 .
H 1 -query: With the tuple <ID j , R j , K j > as input, A I asks C for H 1 query. Upon receiving the query, C searches the list L 1 and responses α j if the tuple <ID j , R j , K j , α j > is in the list L 1 . Otherwise, C chooses α j ∈ Z * p and responds α j to A I , and then inserts the tuple
H 2 -query: With the tuple <ID j , θ j , R j > as input, A I asks C for H 2 query. Upon receiving the query, C searches the list L 2 and responses k j if the tuple <ID j , θ j , R j , k j > is in the list L 2 . Otherwise, C chooses k j ∈ Z * p and responds k j to A I , and then inserts the tuple
H 3 -query: With the tuple <ID j , M j ||ID S ,j, R j , θ j , a j ,n−1, . . . , a j , 1, a j , 0 > as input, A I asks C for H 3 query. Upon receiving the query, C searches the list L 3 and responses h j if the tuple <ID j , M j ||ID S ,j, R j , θ j , a j ,n−1, . . . , a j , 1, a j , 0, h j > is in the list L 3 . Otherwise, C chooses h j ∈ Z * p and responds h j to A I , and then inserts the tuple <ID j , M j ||ID S ,j, R j , θ j , a j ,n−1, . . . , a j , 1, a j , 0, h j > into L 3 .
Phase 1: A I asks C for a series of queries, then C responds as follows:
Create(ID j ) query: A I asks C for aCreate(ID j ) query. Upon receiving the query, C checks whether the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > is in the list L C . If yes, C keeps the tuple. Otherwise, C randomly chooses three integers x j , y j , l j ∈ Z * p , sets l j = H 0 (ID j , PK j ), D j = y j P-l j P pub , X j = x j P, and then performs as follows: a) If ID j = ID * i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, sets SK j = ⊥ and PK j = X j + D j , and then updates the tuples <ID j , (⊥, ⊥),
. . , n}, sets SK j = x j + y j and PK j = X j + D j , and then updates the tuples <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > in the list L C and <ID j , PK j , l j > in the list L 0 .
Set-Secret-Value query: A I asks C for a Set-Secret-Value query on the identity ID j . Upon receiving the query, C checks if the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > is in the list L C . If yes, C returns x j to A I ; otherwise, C asks a Creat(ID j ) query to obtain the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j >, and then returns x j to A I .
Extract-Partial-Private-key query: A I asks C for an Extract-Partial-Private-key query on the identity ID j . Upon receiving the query, C responds as follows: a) If ID j = ID i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, C stops the protocol execution. b) If ID j = ID i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, C checks if the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > is in the list L C . If yes, C returns y j to A I ; otherwise, C asks a Creat(ID j ) query to obtain the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j >, and then returns y j to A I .
Set-Public-key query: A I asks C for a Set-Public-key query on the identity ID j . Upon receiving the query, C checks if the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > is in the list L C . If yes, C returns PK j to A I ; otherwise, C asks a Creat(ID j ) query to obtain the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j >, and then returns PK j to A I .
Public-Key-Replacement query: If A I asks C to replace PK j of ID j with PK j chosen by him, C looks into the list L C for PK j and updates PK j with PK j .
Signcryption query: With a plaintext M , an identity ID S and a group of receivers L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }, A I asks C for a Signcryption query. Upon receiving the query, C judges whether the tuple <ID S , (x S , d S ), PK S > is in the list L C . If yes, C does the following steps to generate ciphertext c * ; otherwise, C performs a Creat(ID S ) query to obtain the private key SK S and the public key PK S , then does the following steps to generate ciphertext c * :
1) Randomly choose an integer r ∈ Z * p , then compute R = rP, K j = r(PK j + H 0 (ID j , PK j )P 0 ) and
2) Randomly choose an integer θ ∈ Z * p , and construct an n-order polynomial:
De-Signcryption query: With identity ID j for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and ciphertext c j =< R j , Z j , h j , v j , a j ,n−1, . . . , a j , 1, a j , 0 >, A I asks C for a De-Signcryption query. Upon receiving the query, C does as follows:
If there is no such tuple, C outputs failure and aborts the game. Otherwise, C obtains
2) Search the list L 1 for a tuple <ID j , R j , K j , α j > and set the polynomial:
3) Search the list L 0 for a tuple <ID j , PK j , l j >. If there is no such tuple, C outputs failure and aborts the game. Otherwise, C obtains <ID j , PK j > from the tuple <ID j , PK j , l j >.
4)
Choose the tuple <ID j , θ j , R j , k j > from the list L 2 and <ID j , R j , K j , α j > from the list L 1 , and repeatedly check whether < R j , K j > is a CDHP tuple or not.
6) Test whether M t = M j holds. If yes, C returns M j to A I . Otherwise, C returns failure and aborts the game.
Challenge: A I chooses a pair of plaintext < M 0 , M 1 > with equal length, and sends them to C. Upon receiving < M 0 , M 1 >, C randomly chooses a bit β ∈{0,1} and calculates the ciphertext c * with the chosen plaintext M β as follows:
2) Choose α i ∈ Z * p , for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}; 3) Choose an integer θ ∈ Z * p and construct a polynomial:
Phase 2: A I asks C for a series of queries as described in In summary, during the process that A I asks the challenger C for queries, the successful probability of q k times Creat(ID) queries is (1 − 
If A I has the non-negligible probability advantage ε to win Game 1 within probability polynomial time τ , C has the non-negligible probability advantage:
to solve CDHP within probability polynomial time: 
where T m is the time spent for executing an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation. Proof: Assume that within the polynomial time τ , the adversary A II can attack the IND-CLMS-CCA-II of the proposed CLMS scheme with a non-negligible probability advantage ε, then there must be a challenger C who can solve the CDHP by interacting with A II ; that is, for given < P, aP, bP>, C will output abP.
Similar to Theorem 3, C maintains the lists L i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) and L C .
Setup: C randomly chooses two integers s, a ∈ Z * p and generates the system's public parameters Params Hash queries: A II asks C for a series of Hash queries as described in Theorem 3.
Phase 1: A II asks C for a series of the following queries and C responses accordingly:
Create (ID j ): A II asks C for a Create(ID j ) query. Upon receiving the query, C checks whether the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > is in the list L C . If yes, C keeps the tuple. Otherwise, C randomly chooses three integers
P, and then performs as follows: a) If ID j = ID i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, sets SK j = ⊥ and PK j = X j + D j , and then updates tuples
. . , n}, sets SK j = x j + y j and PK j = X j + D j , and then updates tuples
Set-Secret-Value query: A II asks C for a Set-Secret-Value query on the identity ID j . Upon receiving the query, C responds as follows: a) If ID j = ID i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, C stops the protocol execution.
b) If ID j = ID i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, C checks if the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > is in the list L C . If yes, C returns x j to A II ; otherwise, C asks a Creat(ID j ) query to obtain the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j >, and then returns x j to A II .
Extract-Partial-Private-key query: A II asks C for an Extract-Partial-Private-key query on identity ID j . Upon receiving the query, C checks if the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j > is in the list L C . If yes, C returns y j to A II ; otherwise, C asks a Creat(ID j ) query to obtain the tuple <ID j , (x j , y j ), PK j >, and then returns d j to A II .
Set-Public-key query: This query is the same as performed in Theorem 3.
Public-Key-Replacement query: If A II asks C to replace PK j of ID j with PK j chosen by him, C performs as follows: a) If ID j = ID i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, C stops the protocol execution. b) If ID j = ID i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, C looks into the list L C for PK j and updates PK j with PK j .
Signcryption query: This query is the same as performed in Theorem 3.
De-Signcryption query: This query is the same as performed in Theorem 3.
Challenge: A II chooses a pair of plaintext < M 0 , M 1 > with equal length, and sends them to C. Upon receiving < M 0 , M 1 >, C randomly chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and calculates the ciphertext c * with the chosen plaintext M β as follows:
Phase 2: A II asks C for a series of queries as described in Phase 1, but A II cannot perform Set-Secret-Value query and Extract-Partial-Private-Key query on the user whose public key has been replaced, and A II cannot perform DeSigncryption query on the ciphertext c * .
Guess: A II guesses a bit β * ∈ {0, 1}. If β * = β holds, A II wins Game 2, and C outputs abP = K i + R as the solution to CDHP. Otherwise, A II fails and C outputs failure.
In summary, during the process that A II asks the challenger C for queries, the successful probability of q k times Creat(ID)queries is (1 − 
If A II has the non-negligible probability advantage ε to win Game 2 within probability polynomial time τ , C has the non-negligible probability advantage:
where T m is the time spent for executing an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation and T i is the time spent for executing a modular inversion operation. Proof: Assume that within the polynomial time τ , the adversary A I can attack the sEUF-CLMS-CPA-I of the proposed CLMS scheme with a non-negligible probability advantage ε, then there must be a challenger C who can solve the CDHP by interacting with A I ; that is, for given < P, aP, bP>, C will output abP.
Similar to Theorem3, C maintains the lists L i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) and L C .
Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate the system master key s = a ∈ Z * p and the system's public parameters 
There is a restriction that the ciphertext c * cannot be generated by Signcryption query.
In summary, during the process that A I asks the challenger C for queries, the successful probability of q k times Creat (ID) 
If A I has the non-negligible probability advantage ε to win Game 3 within probability polynomial time τ , C has the non-negligible probability advantage:
where T m is the time spent for executing an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation. Proof: Assume that within the polynomial time τ , the adversary A II can attack the sEUF-CLMS-CPA-II of the proposed CLMS scheme with a non-negligible probability advantage ε, then there must be a challenger C who can solve the CDHP by interacting with A II ; that is, for given < P, aP, bP>, C will output abP.
Setup: C randomly chooses two integers s, a ∈ Z * p and generates the system's public parameters Params=< p, 
In summary, during the process that A II asks the challenger C for queries, the successful probability of q k times Creat(ID) 
If A II has the non-negligible probability advantage ε to win Game 4 within probability polynomial time τ , C has the non-negligible probability advantage:
where T m is the time spent for executing an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation and T i is the time spent for executing a modular inversion operation. Proof : Assume that within the polynomial time τ , the adversary A I can attack the ANON-CLMS-CCA-I of the proposed CLMS scheme with a non-negligible probability advantage ε, then there must be a challenger C who can solve the CDHP by interacting with A I ; that is, for given < P, aP, bP>, C will output abP.
Setup: C runs this algorithm to generate the system master key s = a ∈ Z * p and the system's public parameters Params to solve CDHP within probability polynomial time:
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON
To show the advantages of our scheme, we will compare our scheme with schemes [23] , [31] , [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] , [41] and [42] in terms of computational efficiency and functions, because these schemes are similar to our scheme in functions or cryptographic foundation.
A. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In order to express the computational efficiency of each scheme conveniently, we define some symbols to represent the time spent on different computations, shown in TABLE 2 (The data are from [34] ). The time spent on the encryption/signcryption and decryption/de-signcryption algorithms of each scheme only includes the computational operations listed in TABLE 2, because the computational operations which are not listed take so little time as to be negligible. The time spent on encryption/signcryption process and decryption/de-signcryption process is shown in TABLE 3, from where we can see the performance of each scheme in terms of computational complexity.
In TABLE 4, we give the simulation running time of each scheme under n = 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25, where n is the number of authorized receivers. The simulation is implemented on a Inter(R) Core(TM)2 Duo 2.93GHz processor and 2.00GB RAM using Windows XP and JDK Visual C++ 6.0, the length of private key is 128bits and symmetric encryption algorithm is AES. To facilitate simulation, we use SHA-1 to implement H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 . For example, ''{0,1} * '' and ''G p '' are two input parameters of H 0 , and we can compute SHA-1({0,1} * ||G p ) as the output of H 0 . We adopt the similar way to implement for the hash functions in the related schemes.
From TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 , we can see that our scheme is more efficient than schemes [23] , [31] , [34] [35] [36] [37] , [41] , and [42] in encryption/signcryption process, and it is more efficient than schemes [23] , [31] , [35] , [37] , [38] , and [41] in decryption/de-signcryption process. However, our scheme is more inefficient than schemes [38] and [39] in encryption/signcryption process, and it is more inefficient than schemes [34] , [36] , [39] , and [42] in decryption/ de-signcryption process, because we have increased some computation to avoid the use of secure channels. Although the computational complexity of our scheme is higher than that of some schemes, the extra calculation costs are considered acceptable when considering the costs spent on maintaining the secure channel, because it is well known that maintaining a secure channel requires a lot in practical applications.
B. FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON
The comparisons of functions between our scheme and schemes [23] , [31] , [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] , [41] and [42] are shown in TABLE 5, from where we can see the performance of each scheme in terms of functions.
From TABLE 5, we can see that only scheme [23] has key escrow problem because it is based on IBC. In terms of privacy protection, our scheme and schemes [23] , [34] [35] [36] [37] , [39] , and [42] provide receiver anonymity so that no one except the sender knows the authorized receivers, whereas schemes [31] , [38] , and [41] do not consider receiver anonymity. Our scheme and schemes [31] , [38] , and [39] offer source verifiability to resist the forgery of attackers. However, schemes [23] and [37] fails to implement source verifiability function as their claimed, because there is a lack of sender's signature to the message. Schemes [34] [35] [36] , [41] and [42] even do not take source verifiability into account. In addition, our scheme and schemes [23] , [34] , [37] , [39] , and [42] achieve decryption fairness, while other schemes do not. Besides, our scheme and schemes [34] , [35] , [38] , [39] , and [42] have partial private key verifiability which ensures the correctness of the user's partial private key, but other schemes do not have partial private key verifiability. Finally, we can see that only our scheme does not use the secure channel to transmit the partial private key. To sum up, our scheme has more functions than the existing similar schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, in order to solve the problem that the key extract algorithm relies on a secure channel in the existing certificateless multi-receiver signcryption schemes, we proposed a new anonymous certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme, which transmits the partial private key through a public channel. The proposed scheme not only has higher security of the private key, but also reduces the system complexity of the practical applications because it avoids maintaining a secure channel. Therefore, whether in security, efficiency or functions, the proposed scheme is more suitable for practical applications. Although the computational complexity of our scheme is higher than that of some schemes, the extra calculation costs are considered acceptable compared with the costs of maintaining a secure channel. 
